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Creative works must clearly communicate the author’s emotional states but also be able to “infect” the audi-
ences with them; intellectualized or formally complicated 
creations, or those which indicate the author’s detach-
ment are manifestations of degraded and dishonest art 
(Leo Tolstoy). Art should be an escape from personality, 
a skilled depersonalization and an infiltration of extra-
aesthetic experiences (T.S. Eliot). Avant-garde art is an 
expression of emotional reticence and reluctance (Ta-
deusz Peiper). New art is an experiment, a technique, 
a practice aimed at disturbing the aesthetic and percep-
tive habits of the audiences (Viktor Shklovsky). Sincer-
ity of the author is legitimate only when it is constructed 
(Karol Irzykowski). Modern art breaks away from real-
ism which induces simple psycho-physiological reac-
tions (Ortega y Gasset). The avant-garde is rationalist, 
formal, and founded on the primacy of science and the 
idea of progress (Clement Greenberg). “The artistic adage 
of the directness of feelings resembles a person with their 
heart on a plate – it seems thus either banal, or childish. 
Especially as the said directness is frequently accompa-
nied by the triviality of feelings” (Julian Przyboś). Art is 
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things (Greenberg). Avant-garde consists of conceptualism and formal in-
novation (Luigi Pareyson). Abstract art cannot be arbitrary or accidental, it 
must redirect attention from the subject of experiences to the means of its 
own craft (Greenberg). Avant-garde cannot be constantly innovative – it is 
a continuous repetition (Umberto Eco). Modern art privileges all that is anti-
natural, anti-mimetic and anti-real (Rosalind Krauss). Modern art is ocular-
centric (Martin Jay), male-centered and oppressive (Nancy K. Miller), holistic 
and dualist (Jean-François Lyotard). The avant-garde is repression (Krauss).
This is what an argumentative, postulative-receptive development of the 
assumptions behind the modernist aesthetic would look like if we were to 
abbreviate it to an almost absurd length of a single paragraph.1 Or, more pre-
cisely, this is what the development of its avant-garde, intellectualized, “high” 
variety (to use the outdated typology) could be said to look like – juxtaposed 
with the popular, “rear-guard” artistic developments.2 Even considering the 
gradual evolution of its critical attitudes, one notices easily the extreme dual-
ism of these reflections on the modernist artistic tendencies, as well as the 
intellectually dubious, declarative essentialism of these and similar diagnoses. 
Importantly, due to their nature, assertions of this kind fail to capture the 
complex specificity of several, first-rate artistic productions – meanwhile, 
reflecting on them raises several questions only seemingly “unrelated” to the 
phenomena of modernism. Can the avant-garde be viewed only through cat-
egories of depersonalization, detachment, reticence, and rationalization? Why 
does the gulf between the modern current of intellectual art and the figura-
tive mode seem so vast? Are there really no intermediary forms connecting 
these polar opposites? What was the contemporary status of affect, emotion, 
impression, and empathy, and where do the obvious (maybe just too obvious) 
answers come from? Perhaps there existed a current in the arts which eludes 
the above aesthetic distinctions? And if it does, what is its nature?
Following for a while the declarative stylistics of the binary diagno-
ses presented earlier, I will start by proposing at least one answer, name-
ly: modernism may, for certain reasons, be viewed both as rationalistic 
and affective; meanwhile, the avant-garde is the artist’s state of mind 
 1 Referring to ”avant-garde” and ”modernism” in this article, I am following Astradur Eye-
steinsson’s distinction which assumes (speaking generally) that modernism is a broad-
er term that includes avant-garde – a subordinate term which can be characterized 
by a tendency to experimentation and discovery. See Astradur Eysteinsson, “Awangarda 
jako/czy modernizm?,” in Odkrywanie modernizmu. Przekłady i komentarze, ed. Ryszard 
Nycz, trans. Dorota Wojda (Kraków: Universitas, 2004), 195-199. 
 2 Clement Greenberg , Obrona modernizmu. Wybór esejów, trans. Grzegorz Dziamski 
and Maria Śpik-Dziamska (Kraków: Universitas, 2006), 8-18.
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(and body) – and as such it is as rational as it is emotional; finally, I believe 
it is possible to distinguish a different, “alternative” kind of modernity, a cer-
tain avant-garde of the avant-garde whose specificity relies on problematiz-
ing the tensions between the intellectual, the somatic and the emotional. 
In the following parts of my argument I am going to elaborate on those initial 
propositions, reconsider the legitimacy of making a connection between the 
well-established and well-discussed modernist artistic phenomena and the 
recently popular category of affect and – last but not least – propose a model 
of reading and analysis of those artistic realizations, further referred to as “af-
fective criticism.” 
Modernism as a Spatial Agon
The degree of impact of modernist art was determined largely by the tensions 
(rarely explicitly verbalized) between emotions and rationality. Naturally, 
earlier artistic tendencies also depended on the oscillation between these 
two spheres, but (as I will try to prove in the present essay) the specificity 
of modernism resulted directly from its innovative methods of transposing 
affects into the substance of art.
The history of the relations between the intellectual and emotional 
spheres, defined as mutual opposites, may be presented in the form of a si-
nusoid. The sinusoid would illustrate (in a greatly simplified manner) the 
movement from the primacy of reason dominant throughout the Enlight-
enment, through the Romantic privileging of expression identified with an 
eruption of authentic feelings, toward the Positivist restoration of rational-
ity, and finally – at the turn of the twentieth century – the returning focus 
on the author’s spirituality and his or her individualized expression of the 
most affective contents, accompanied by the postulate of authenticity, di-
rectness of expression and the sincerity of emotions represented. However, 
Wilhelm Worringer’s famous 1907 Abstraction and Empathy posits art history to 
be shaped not by subsequent artistic tendencies but by simultaneous, com-
peting currents. These include, on the one hand, a tendency for naturaliza-
tion (in the case of the artist’s affirmative attitude to the surrounding reality 
and a belief in the possibility of successful artistic representation) and on the 
other hand, a tendency for stylization (when the artist, searching for a rational 
order of expression, experiences an anxiety toward the surrounding realities 
and toward the artistic medium itself). From this perspective, simultaneous 
yet radically different currents (differing not only in the complexity of formal 
expression, but also based on different existential and aesthetic worldviews) 
determine the parallel tracks of modernity’s development, including its entire 
system of internal fissures. Consequently, the specificity of modernism would 
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involve a continuous aesthetic oscillation between these models: on the one 
hand, the realistic or empathetic model utilizing the representative rhetoric 
of emotion, experience, and authenticity, which was perhaps realized to the 
greatest extent in the popular variety of so-called high art; and on the other 
hand, the opposing intellectualist model accompanied by the abstract, cub-
ist, formalist, and other modes which, as a principle, rejected all non-rational 
and non-intellectual elements and refused to assign any aesthetic signifi-
cance to what is realistic and recognizable.3 
Searching for the “Third Mode”
In the brilliant conclusion to his reflection on the epiphanic character of the 
modernist attempt to “express the inexpressible,” Ryszard Nycz “risked” a cer-
tain intriguing “hypothesis”: 
the third mode (which so far has found its fullest realization in the 
marginal or “liminal” modern and postmodern art) aims to gather evi-
dence – symptoms, impressions, signals, accounts – for the positive 
existence of the shapeless factuality (monstrous or merely constituting 
background) sensed largely through an ambiguous resistance: as much 
to the subject’s actions (by the force of its inertia) as to the subject’s pow-
ers of representation (through the plasticity of its substance). It seems 
that the modernists refused to assign a positivist ontological status to 
what was formless and protean not only out of fear but quite deliberately. 
They sentenced it, after all, to both a negative and dependent (i.e. par-
tial and only “formal”) existence: that of a necessary but always negated 
part of the binary opposition only in relation to which the perceptible, 
comprehensible and representable forms of existence became truly posi-
tive and valuable. Consequently, one could conclude that the value of the 
works of the third mode would lie in documenting that significant for-
tuitousness of being… If modernist aestheticism located [reality – AD] 
in the ultimately hidden order, internalized and embodied in the (auto) 
revelatory form of art, then for that postmodern art, reality would con-
stitute first and foremost that which modernism refused to attribute to 
existence: the essence-less matter of the real; the shapeless, the insig-
nificant, the meaningless, and elusive.4
 3 Arnold Berleant, Prze-myśleć estetykę. Niepokorne eseje o sztuce, trans. Maria Korusiewicz 
and Tomasz Markiewka (Kraków: Univesitas, 2007), 76.
 4 Ryszard Nycz, Literatura jako trop rzeczywistości (Kraków: Universitas, 2001), 48-49.
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For some reason, Nycz’s argument begins to resemble the object of de-
scription. In other words, there is a repetition of a gesture resulting from the 
modernists’ “fear” and “deliberation”; the category discussed in the conclusion 
is once again sentenced to a fleeting, “partial” and “only formal” presence. 
The sense of factuality and significance of the “third mode’s” existence does 
not resound fully in Nycz’s argument, abandoned (or temporarily suspended 
hopefully) in favor of other analyses. However, while the argument remains 
unfinished, a lot has been said. The rather enigmatic quality of “shapeless 
factuality,” of that which is “formless and protean,” “shapeless, insignificant, 
meaningless and elusive” refers precisely to what I believe to be the affec-
tive dimension discussed in this paper: the irrational, emotional-sensational 
amalgam of human (in this case, writerly) experience. At the risk of simplifi-
cation, it seems that Nycz’s thesis (or intuition) asserts the following: despite 
their various declarations, the modernists had feelings and used them repeat-
edly as a reservoir of possible formal-thematic inspirations, even though they 
were reluctant to admit it. They did not want to admit it, or rather (as also 
suggested by Nycz) rejected, sublimated, or repressed that which repeatedly 
returned in the act of writing as “negative epiphanies.”
Its meandrous nature, or perhaps its subtle, localized (maybe intentional) 
inconsistency is another interesting aspect of Nycz’s reflection. The so-called 
“third mode” registering evidence for the existence of insistent reality, differ-
ent from the main intellectual stream of modernism, is first situated within: 
1. “the marginal or «liminal» modern a n d  postmodern art,” and then more 
declaratively within; 2. “that postmodern art.” The possibility of a synchro-
nous coexistence of different modern streams – the ones defined so far, that is, 
the intellectual and realist ones, as well as the “third mode” proposed by Nycz, 
constituting perhaps the “lining” of the avant-garde (proposed in 1) – is now 
replaced by the postulate of a diachronic succession of interesting regularities 
(proposed in 2) where the “modernist” period is followed by post-modernity 
from which there emerges (like a posthumous child) the late “third” child 
of modernism. Ultimately, Nycz seems to lean toward refusing modernity its 
marginal or liminal tendencies, attributing them instead to the postmodern 
order. I would like to conduct a “defense of modernity” in the rest of the arti-
cle and postulate so as not to cede too quickly to postmodernity that which 
I consider to be thoroughly modernist.
Nycz’s typologizing gesture is very thought-provoking: obviously, the re-
alization and the need to recognize the existence of some kind of “third mode” 
are a consequence of postmodernism’s theoretical achievement, critical ap-
proach, and suspicions about several modernist phenomena, about redefining 
notions, reevaluating categories, and changing focus. It also holds suspicions 
about changing sensibility, awareness and priorities (not only the scholarly 
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ones). Consequently, postmodernity can be seen as forging tools appropriate 
for conducting interpretations of modernist phenomena (both the marginal 
and mainstream ones). Such interpretations also fit the formula of “discover-
ing modernity” and “becoming aware of the shift in perspective, a shift result-
ing from the phenomena and trends described as postmodern.”5
A similar “revindicating” principle of reasoning allows me to propose 
a model of “affective criticism” – one inspired (to various degrees) by the 
modern, postmodern, and the post-postmodern methodologies and reading 
methods including deconstruction, feminist criticism, reception research, 
the so called “affective” and “affirmative” turns, and other methods. Setting 
aside for now the old argument about the status of meaning extracted from 
or read into the interpreted work, the most productive approach here seems 
to incorporate both the modern and postmodern tools useful in an “affective” 
analysis of the “third mode” which manifested itself (not only in the back-
ground) and realized itself (not only partially) in modernity. In this context, 
I believe Nycz’s intuitions, expressed en passant, to be highly inspiring as they 
have so far found no precedence in the humanities on avant-gardism. What 
he describes as modernism’s “margin” will become the center of the follow-
ing analysis while the “lining” of the avant-garde will be treated, at least for 
the time being, as its outer shell, in order to reveal the “twofold” character 
of avant-garde postulates and works.
Double-winged Modernity
In his detailed study of T.S. Eliot’s “Tradition and Individual Talent,” Michał 
Paweł Markowski recapitulates the poet’s argumentation in the following 
words:
emotions are meaningful only when they are represented, in other words, 
made objective by the mind and the work of art. Emotions which evade 
presentation, which create the lining, the substratum of our existence, 
must be eradicated not only from the sphere of art but also from life 
as it is. This is the founding gesture of the modern sensibility whose one 
wing – let us call it the male, cool and anxious one – includes T.S. Eliot. 
The other wing – female, fervent and bold – is represented by Virginia 
Woolf. But the tale of the other wing must be left for another occasion.6
 5 Ryszard Nycz, ”Słowo wstępne,” in Odkrywanie modernizmu, 6-7.
 6 Michał Paweł Markowski, „Literatura i uczucia. T.S. Eliot i wrażliwość nowoczesna,” 
in Dzieła, języki, tradycje, ed. Włodzimierz Bolecki and Ryszard Nycz (Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo IBL PAN, 2006), 240.
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Also in this case (although following a different principle) the nature 
of argumentation begins to resemble the object of description: the sharp-
ness of Eliot’s distinctions is reflected by Markowski’s essay, as evidenced 
by his binary, double-winged typology of the modernist phenomena. There 
is no space here for the intermediary forms, hybrids, and phenomena es-
caping clear systematization. There is no space for the doubt which may 
result from the conducted (and somewhat controversial) division into the 
male and female streams in art. One could also wonder about the absence 
of other tendencies, for instance, the strong, modern currents of realist or 
popular art. However, Markowski’s interpretation is interesting for at least 
three reasons: firstly, he argues “fervently” and methodically for the pri-
orities of Eliot’s manifesto which in fact do not include tradition, canon, 
and the individual talent, but precisely the crucial intellectual work per-
formed on the writerly emotional states. Secondly, Markowski distinguish-
es within modernity two avant-garde currents, both artistically valuable, 
and positions them opposite of that which is a f f e c t i v e. Finally, and im-
portantly, Markowski is “bold” in stating directly that emotions remain 
emotions even in Eliot who persistently seeks to escape them (and advises 
others to do the same).
The Avant-garde “Conspiracy Against Chaos”7
This is how Thomas Stearns Eliot justifies the need for creative 
depersonalization:
Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; 
it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality. 
But, of course, only those who have personality and emotions know what 
it means to want to escape from these things.8
Understanding Eliot’s “depersonalized” theory of poetry (requiring the 
artist to “catalyze” personal emotions, treated as a creative material, “com-
bine” them into new compounds and rework them into new literary values) 
is crucial for an understanding of the modernist sensibility. New art is not to 
 7 Karol Irzykowski, Czyn i słowo oraz Fryderyk Hebbel jako poeta konieczności, Lemiesz i sz-
pada przed sądem publicznym. Prolegomena do charakterologii (Kraków: Wydawnictwo 
Literackie, 1980), 475-476.
 8 Thomas Stearns Eliot, “Tradition and Individual Talent,” in The Sacred Wood. Essays 
on  Poetry and Criticism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1921; New York: Bartleby.com, 2000), 
accessed May 18, 2017, http://www.bartleby.com/200/sw4.html/.
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be devoid of individual or emotional content. Quite on the contrary, the ques-
tion of the work’s affective qualities is central to Eliot’s reflection. Unlike his 
predecessors who limited themselves to “poetic meditations” on the subject 
of emotions, the modern poet should intensify work on emotions in order 
to transform the sensory-affective experiences into categories of the mind 
and find the most adequate “verbal equivalent for states of mind and feeling.”9 
Consequently, the creative process is not an escape from emotion, but is 
founded on a directly affective-emotional amalgam: “what you start from is 
nothing so definite as an emotion, in any ordinary sense, it is still more cer-
tainly not an idea.”10 What is crucial then is the act of mediation between the 
spheres of “feeling” and “understanding,” between the emotion and the idea. 
But the cited passage from “Tradition and Individual Talent” speaks directly 
about an “escape” from emotion and personality. What kind of escape does 
the author have in mind?
It is hard to resist the impression of a strong resentment resounding 
through Eliot’s reflection, noticeable especially in the following statement: 
“But, of course, only those who have personality and emotions know what it 
means to want to escape from these things.” This remark seems to allude to an 
undefined unity of “those who have personality and emotions,” perhaps also 
those who have made traumatic experiences or feel more than they actually 
reveal, and for some reason try to distance themselves from those experiences, 
precisely through the mediation of art.
Dispersed hints of such an “escapist” dimension of artistic activity can be 
found also in the essays, diaries and criticism by [Polish] avant-garde artists, 
for instance Adam Ważyk:
The hyperbolic voracity of the futurists had obvious causes. The time 
of war overlapped with their days of youth, the onset of their puber-
ty. They starved. The days of futurism were hungry too. Hunger was 
the basic category of social classification. People were divided into 
the satiate ones and the others. “But I am forever hungry” Wat wrote, 
in an act of solidarity with those others. Stern ostensibly absolved 
from guilt all who were threatened by hunger, prostitutes, and thieves. 
The fear of hunger, the only theme resulting from experience, became 
 9 Thomas Stearns Eliot, review of Metaphysical Lyrics and Poems of the Seventeenth Cen-
tury: Donne to Butler, ed. Herbert J. C. Grierson (Oxford: Clarendon Press) first published 
in the Times Literary Supplement, 20 (1921), accessed May 17, 2017, http://www.uwyo.edu/
numimage/eliot_metaphysical_poets.htm/.
 10 Thomas Stearns Eliot, “The Three Voices of Poetry,” in On Poetry and Poets (New York: Far-
rar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 107.
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a decalogue of the stomach in the later long poem, Europa. It was in the 
times of futurism that Jasieński wrote Pieśń o głodzie [The Song of Hunger] 
… The trauma of hunger did not always involve everyone, but a certain 
oral hypersensitivity and a passion to devour everything characterized 
them all.11
One could criticize Ważyk for the anecdotal character of his account, for dal-
lying with the readers by jesting about the premises of past artistic endeavors 
and for ultimately trivializing the value of contemporary art. But the play-
ful tone is only a ruse, and his reminiscence an act of courageous disclosure 
rather than of thoughtlessness or bad faith. Ważyk not so much mocks his 
older colleagues as reveals the motivations for forming the avant-garde (in-
cluding his own). He verbalizes a pattern which seemingly did not conform to 
the avant-garde tactic, explaining formal choices with the “decalogue of the 
stomach,” sharpness of expression with basic physiological needs, and inno-
vation with intensity and severity of experiencing the war, undermining the 
myth of “impersonality” and “autonomy” of modern art. Importantly, Ważyk’s 
frankness with regard to the causes of the psychosomatic trauma is not re-
stricted to simply registering the basic deficits of the period. Also his language 
reveals a conviction in an affective undercurrent in futurist work: the poet 
talks about “experience,” “hypersensitivity,” “passion” and “fear” which deter-
mined creative work and which he attributes to the most original modern 
artists, including Witkacy:
Witkacy’s prophetism, as any emotional prophetism, did not come from 
the ability to prophesize but from fear, from the shock caused by the ex-
perienced events. The sensitivity of young age was traumatized.12
The shock results mainly from the extreme experiences of the war period,13 
which according to Ważyk, changed the fate of the interwar (as well as post-
war) art. But he goes beyond obvious statements on the consequences of ex-
perienced trauma, exhaustion of contemporary art, inability to forget, or the 
ethical and aesthetic crisis. First and foremost, Ważyk’s language exposes 
 11 Adam Ważyk, Dziwna historia awangardy [Unusual History of the Avant-garde] (Warszawa: 
Czytelnik, 1976), 46.
 12 Ważyk, Dziwna, 44.
 13 Of course, the experience of war was just one of the causes which included also the 
dynamics and scale of global modernization, growing medical knowledge, the impact 
of the twentieth-century scientific achievements, technological-civilizational progress 
and the great influence of (mostly Freudian) psychoanalytic theory. 
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(as do several other commentators of the period14) a shift in the way of  e x -
p e r i e n c i n g  e m o t i o n s:
The fact that the same sensitization manifested simultaneously in several 
poets supports the proposal that we are dealing with a historical mo-
ment: a jump from the centrifugal principle to the centripetal principle, 
one sweeping over all centers of absorption, over all senses.15
The Romantic and neo-Romantic “centrifugal” release of emotions 
(and the belief that the creative process is an eruption of authentic, explicable 
and expressible feelings) gave way to the “centripetal” method based on the 
“accumulation” and intellectual “reworking” of affective-sensory experiences. 
The change was dictated, firstly, by the shock of new experiences, secondly, 
by the need for expression, and finally, by the conviction that there is a dis-
crepancy between contemporary forms of expression and those experiences. 
As such, artistic inquiries of the avant-gardists were also (auto)therapeutic: 
it is no coincidence that in his discussion of “techniques” Viktor Shklovsky 
notes that art should return to man – not just to the audience, but also to the 
artists themselves – the capacity to sense the world.16 Jan Brzękowski states 
directly that “poets who lived through the war and came to know all its hor-
rors… could not continue writing poetry of their predecessors who existed 
in more ordinary conditions.”17 Ważyk spoke of the specificity of the forma-
tion of “people mentally beset, wounded by history, gifted – if one may call it 
a gift – with a traumatic sensibility.”18
 14 An interesting commentary on those changes can be found in the writing by Umberto 
Eco: “Our universe is in full crisis. The order of words no longer corresponds to the order 
of things: whereas the former still insists on following a traditional system, the latter seems 
to be mostly characterized by disorder and discontinuity, or so science tells us. Our feel-
ings and emotions have been frozen into stereotypical expressions that have nothing to do 
with our reality… Though it is commonly believed that avant-garde artists are out of touch 
with the human community in which they live, and that traditional art remains in close con-
tact with it, the opposite is true. In fact, only avant-garde artists are capable of establishing 
a meaningful relationship with the world in which they live.” Umberto Eco, The Open Work, 
trans. Anna Cancogni (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989) 141-142.
 15 Ważyk, Dziwna, 47.
 16 Wiktor Szkłowski (V. Shklovsky), “Wskrzeszenie słowa,” in Rosyjska szkoła stylistyki. Wybór 
tekstów, ed. Maria Renata Mayenowa and Zygmunt Saloni (Warszawa: PWN, 1970), 61.
 17 Jan Brzękowski, Szkice literackie i artystyczne 1925-1970, ed. Andrzej Waśkiewicz (Kraków: 
Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1978), 61.
 18 Ważyk, Dziwna, 101.
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The creative act became here, to quote from Nycz, an act of “exorcising 
chaos” which revealed itself when the image of a stable reality had disinte-
grated.19 Of emotional-mental chaos in particular, one might add:
The dualism of body and soul was under attack or abolished, the meta-
physical ambitions restricted or abandoned, moralism disappeared while 
moral criteria moved to the sphere of social relations. Sensitization to the 
values of life pervaded the complementary spirit of youthful enthusiasm 
and despair caused by life being not what it should be. Just after the war, 
poets of various formations shared in the civilizational anxiety spawning 
visions of European or global destruction, colorful, ingenious and unrea-
sonable… All of that distinguished the new Polish poetry from the older 
one… including [among others – A.D.] the Skamander group.20
Once again avant-gardism reveals itself, to use Greenberg’s formulation, 
not as a program or style but as an attitude21 or, as Brzękowski puts it, “not 
as much a literary direction but as a spiritual condition.”22 A condition which 
did not fit the old framework of experience and feeling, a condition which at 
the same time could not be “contained,” which “ruptured” the formulas of tra-
ditional art. Consequently, Przyboś notes, modern art overcame the bounda-
ries which aesthetic repeatedly imposed on the human emotion.23 This is 
why – analogically to Adorno’s thesis that the avant-garde work is the only 
possible expression given the contemporary state of the world – avant-garde 
was the only possible way to not so much present feelings or repress them 
(as Krauss would argue24), but to construct emotions and become aware of the 
importance of affect precisely t h r o u g h  creation. The creative act is viewed 
here as a simultaneous process of sensory experience, registering and con-
ceptualizing or mediating between the orders of the body, consciousness, 
affect and the artistic artifact (which are usually separated in discourse).25 
 19 Nycz, Literatura jako trop, 48.
 20 Ważyk, Dziwna, 31-32.
 21 Greenberg, Obrona, 57.
 22 Brzękowski, Szkice, 29.
 23 Julian Przyboś, Linia i gwar, vol. 1 (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1959), 75.
 24 Rosalind Krauss, Oryginalność awangardy i inne mity modernistyczne, trans. Monika Szuba 
(Gdańsk: słowo/obraz/terytoria, 2011), 17-30.
 25 Compare also the Deleuze-based concept of art co-responding with the receiver and the 
aesthetic experience seen as a constant mediation between the work, the environment 
49a g n i e s z k a  d a u k s z a  a f f e c t i v e  a v a n t - g a r d i s me s s a y s
Consequently, the new art, rather than registering some pre-existent emo-
tions, “creates” and reveals them in a concrete form, removing the Romantic 
dualism of feeling and word/image,26 establishing new emotional connec-
tions.27 Thus, artistic practice does not just produce art, but also a lesson in ex-
perience, something Brzękowski paid special attention to:
New poets and writers are incomprehensible. Or rather – they are hard 
to comprehend. Indeed… one of the causes lies in the reading audience. 
Each novelty shocks, intrigues, blurs judgment. This is accompanied 
by another attribute: it is difficult. Difficult not because of some inher-
ent reasons but rather because we must create new categories of feelings 
and responses in order to evaluate it. This is also why novelty requires 
mental work – it is tiring… I hope that my remarks may contribute to 
understanding the goals and methods of the New Art, that the reading 
audience will look differently at the modern artists and try to feel them.28
Beliefs such as this one are not very different from Irzykowski’s notion 
of “incomprehensibility” which assumes that each valuable work must contain 
an element of incomprehensibility and pose “difficulties either in one’s mind, 
when the matter concerns accepting new ideas, or in one’s heart, when we 
are talking about a new way of feeling things.”29 The challenges that avant-
garde posed to perception and interpretation were probably responsible for 
the claims of its “incomprehensibility,” “intellectualism,” “impersonality” 
and a certain “emotionlessness.” One should add to this list the sensation 
of “novelty” which Greenberg described as a feeling of surprise experienced 
by the audience encountering an avant-garde work which refuses to fit the 
system of internal expectations and habits.30 This effect was probably respon-
sible for the sense of aesthetic inaccessibility evoked by the new art. Mean-
while, contradicting the stereotypical assumptions of avant-garde’s elitism, 
one may find hope in Brzękowski’s wishful argument that the audiences 
can make the effort not even to understand but to “feel” the modern artistic 
and the impression of the receiver, Elizabeth Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the 
Framing of the Earth (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
 26 Przyboś, Linia i gwar, 74.
 27 Irzykowski, Czyn i słowo, 412.
 28 Brzękowski, Szkice literackie, 71.
 29 Irzykowski, Czyn i słowo, 477.
 30 Greenberg, Obrona modernizmu, 128.
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 activity. What is meant here is more than the simple mechanism of empathic 
identification adequate for the popular art (which Brzękowski positions at the 
opposite end31) we are rather talking about experimental testing and perhaps 
shaping of a formative aesthetic sensibility: 
They [the new artists – A.D.] play the role of an experimental laboratory 
and a scientific workshop. Once new values are discovered, they become 
popularized and applied (the utilitarian moment) by hundreds of me-
diocre artists in cheap imagery, advertising, interior design, clothing etc. 
… Pure, abstract, innovative art is like mathematics or logic: it teaches 
to think according to the artistic principles of creating and solving one’s 
own tasks. It makes artists aware of themselves.32
Discrepant orders of the “modern,” “creative” and the popular, “derivative,” 
unoriginal art which Brzękowski describes elsewhere as “applied” and “utili-
tarian,” correspond to the two already distinguished modes: the intellectual 
and the realist. But the traditionally defined “abstractness” begins to acquire 
a new meaning: it is meant to result in new principles and tools aimed at 
understanding, “becoming aware” and conceptualizing the surrounding re-
ality. This is why, Umberto Eco suggests, avant-garde art resembles a scien-
tific revolution – every work of modern art creates new laws, imposes a new 
paradigm, a new way of looking at the world.33 As he did in Eliot, the artist 
fulfills the role of a “catalyst,” transforming impressions physically, sensorially, 
affectively and intellectually into the tissue of art. The scientific–experimental 
metaphor does not appear here without a reason.
Artists function in this system as an “experimental laboratory and a sci-
entific workshop” which corresponds with the avant-garde rhetoric of pro-
gress, inventiveness, and science reflected emblematically in Pound’s 
postulate to “make it new.” Nycz’s “imperative of inventiveness which is 
of key importance to modernism; the imperative to create/discover the 
new”34 is more than a linguistic construct: certain analogies between sci-
ence and modern art reach much further, as Greenberg points out when 
he speaks of modern art belonging to the same specific cultural tendency 
 31 Compare also Berleant’s claim that every type of art is at least to some extent emphatic 
since art involves several senses, A. Berleant, Prze-myśleć estetykę, 101-106.
 32 Brzękowski, Szkice literackie i artystyczne, 74.
 33 Umberto Eco, ”Innowacja i powtórzenie: pomiędzy modernistyczną i postmodernistyczną 
estetyką,” trans. to Polish by T. Rutkowska, in Przekazy i opinie 1-2 (1990): 13.
 34 Nycz, ”Słowo wstępne,” in Odkrywanie modernizmu, 17.
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as modern science.35 In the traditional, positivist perspective the disparity 
of the two disciplines excludes any convergences and mutual inspirations, 
as is exemplified in Michał Sobeski’s conservative argument making a clear 
distinction between the aesthetic and scientific principle:
Art is about a proper recreation of mental experiences, one’s own and oth-
ers’. Science, on the other hand, elucidates those experiences by discover-
ing their mutual relationships and dependencies, in other words, by prov-
ing their underlying principles.36 
In the modern configuration, art breaks the commandment of “proper” 
recreation and usurps the tasks of science, which itself is a part of a broader 
modernist concept of creating an objective theory and a disciplined, autono-
mous art whose language, as Peiper hoped, would “originate in the scientific 
movements of the last decades.”37
The scientist longings of the avant-gardists took various forms. What 
lied at their core was the same imperative of creative formal innovativeness, 
confirming Astradur Eysteinsson’s observation that the avant-garde (dis-
tinguished from the broader phenomenon of modernism) denoted in fact 
contemporary experimental activity.38 In the plastic arts, innovativeness 
manifested mainly through increasing abstractness, deformation, ambigu-
ity and untypical presentations of artistic artifacts. In literature, it extended 
from the level of the individual word through the manipulation of increas-
ingly complex syntactic structures39 to the author’s self-declared attitude to 
the work and a form of (auto) presentation. Seen from this perspective, the 
most outstanding techniques of the first half of the twentieth century found 
in the writings of Joyce, Mann, Canetti, and Woolf – and in Poland, in Schulz, 
Choromański, or Gombrowicz – such as internal monologue, stream of con-
sciousness, self-reflexivity, psychologism, deformations of perspective, or 
certain figurations of affects can be described as tools which complicate the 
simplicity of the message. They erase the human factor on the one hand, but 
 35 Greenberg, Obrona modernizmu, 53.
 36 Michał Sobeski, Wybór pism estetycznych, ed. Sław Krzemień-Ojak (Kraków: Universitas, 
2010), 96.
 37 Peiper’s remarks from 1935 quoted in Ważyk, Dziwna historia, 97. 
 38 Eysteinsson, “Awangarda jako/czy modernizm?,” 65.
 39 Compare Brzękowski: „The new experimental wave in Poland focused on the word itself 
in an attempt to first break it down and then create new combinations from the resulting 
segments, or to explore their potential.” Brzękowski, Szkice literackie, 133.
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on the other, continue to express the personal or affective content in a new, 
“deformed” or “strange” form. For the sake of the argument presented in this 
essay, I am going to propose an affective critique of a few artistic realizations, 
which should allow me to distinguish typical organizational methods of the 
choromaniacs [from the name of M. Choromański – A.W.] and of Giacometti’s 
sculpture, among others.
Grotesque Creations of the Avant-garde
The ambivalence of the avant-garde artists to the emotional expression, on 
the level of rhetoric, revealed itself, on the one hand, in the calls for emotional 
reticence (vide Peiper’s metaphor of reluctant emotion) or restraint (“Poets 
– restrain your emotions!” – Jalu Kurek40) but on the other hand, in a convic-
tion of the utopian character of the affective “break” and the desire to shape 
a new sensibility in the audience, “to renew the freshness and sharpness 
of cognitive and emotional reactions,”41 turning art into a factory of feelings 
which “animate, invigorate or cleanse” and allow art to “nobly compete with 
the factory of ventilators, medicine and soaps.”42 The discrepancies of their 
theoretical postulates were reflected in the artistic practice which for some 
reason became unanimously viewed as an actual expression of avant-garde 
“restraint.” It may indeed  s e e m  restrained, especially when seen from the 
perspective of the declarations, commentaries and manifestos of the avant-
gardists themselves.
But the issue is far from simple and in order to notice the affective poten-
tial of avant-gardism it is enough to abandon the traditional understanding 
of the relations between affect and literature/art (for instance, viewing them 
as a vassalization of literature by emotion – “poetry as a language of feelings”) 
requiring an appropriate “thematic” reading. Consequently, one can distin-
guish for instance the following property – literature of the choromaniacs un-
kindly described by Ignacy Fik as a manifestation of disrespect for the “histori-
cal achievement of the human psyche: the creative and active consciousness 
put in the service of unconscious tremors, outbursts and impulses related via 
 40 See also Jalu Kurek’s other aesthetic postulates “Abandon the personal and individual 
lyric. Poetry is a function, a service, a social craft and you can smuggle in it only inasmuch 
of the so-called individuality as an average tailor does when he sews new clothing. You 
must create the world, not recreate your own heart. Who cares about that?” Quted in Ar-
tur Hutnikiewicz Od czystej formy do literatury faktu (Toruń: Wydawnictwo TNT, 1967), 227.
 41 Tadeusz Pawłowski, Wybór pism estetycznych, ed. Grzegorz Sztabiński (Kraków: Universi-
tas, 2010), 282.
 42 Tadeusz Peiper, ”Także inaczej,”  Zwrotnica 7 (1926): 198.
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accidental appearance in mental time.”43 In other words, such literature “sniffed” 
and “probed the ulcers, shameful spots, and dirty nooks,”44 penetrated “men-
tal exoticness,”45 while multiplying “clinical specimens” and “physiological–
metaphysical creations.”46 Fik’s interpretative perceptiveness and surprising 
astuteness reveal what was later frequently marginalized or misunderstood 
about these works: an obsessive fixation on the emotional which took the most 
extreme forms and seemed to directly stimulate formal innovativeness.
Clinical Literature
This can be seen in the work of Michał Choromański himself, for instance 
in his flagship Zazdrość i medycyna [Envy and Medicine], a novel whose title 
speaks for itself and which reveals in full force the longings and dilemmas 
of the avant-garde formation. In this case the method involves a clinical 
analysis of a single affect: envy. Affect is treated as a living organism sub-
jected to a series of trials and experiments. The formal technique involves an 
experimental act of vivisection – the narrative is in fact reduced to reveal-
ing subsequent steps of a scientific, medical study. The analytical method 
of the affective state is simultaneous to the presentations of bodily vivisec-
tions illustrated by detailed descriptions of surgical procedures. However, 
a clinical separation of the private, homely space and the hospital one be-
comes impossible; the protagonists perform constant exchanges and shifts, 
“infecting” the antiseptic conditions. As in Latour’s reflection on Pasteur’s 
workplace, the boundaries of the laboratory are not impermeable and the 
dichotomy of the inside and the outside is abolished. In fact, Latour claims 
that “the very difference between the inside and the outside, and the differ-
ence of scale between micro and macro levels, is precisely what laboratories 
are built to destabilize or undo,” 47 in order to make phenomena visible, 
observable and known.48 An identical process takes place in Choromański’s 
 43 Ignacy Fik, Wybór pism krytycznych, ed. Andrzej Chruszczyński (Warszawa: Książka 
i Wiedza, 1961), 130.
 44 Ibid., 127.
 45 Ibid., 126.
 46 Ibid., 127.
 47 Bruno Latour, “Give Me a Laboratory and I will Raise the World,” in Science Observed: Per-
spectives on the Social Study of Science, ed. Karin Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay (Lon-
don: Sage, 1983) 143.
 48 Ibid., 168.
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textual laboratory. The writer turns a small space of the Zakopane resort, 
somewhat isolated (for instance, geographically) into an experimental 
space where the irrational and rational clash against each other. To reveal 
all details of the mechanism he is interested in, Choromański “ignores” the 
“complexity” – or the “amalgam character” – of the feeling sphere (the mac-
roscale) and selects one affect (the microscale) which he then “materializes” 
to perform a series of operations. The author conceptualizes what is seem-
ingly “inexpressible,” but does it very factually and “coldly,” in a “disciplined,” 
“restrained” manner. The result resembles the analogous revealing of Pas-
teur’s microbes which Latour names “invisible actors” who, in the process 
of analysis, “show their moves and development in pictures so clear that… 
the invisible becomes visible and the ‘thing’ becomes a written trace they 
can read at will as if it were a text.”49 Choromański experimentally textual-
izes an emotion and dissects it, revealing its mechanisms and by doing so, 
realizes a primary postulate – his art fulfills the role of logic of “making the 
artist aware of himself.”
Creation as a “Mental Cardiac Death”
Gombrowicz’s early stories constitute a very interesting case. Putting it simply 
(and ignoring, for now, the multitude of alternative interpretations), almost 
each of his stories can be read as an intriguing study of affective states: from 
the thorough revulsion of The Memoirs of Stefan Czarniecki through the shame 
of Lawyer Kraykowski’s Dancer to the timidity and fear in On the Kitchen Steps. 
However, A Premeditated Crime seems particularly interesting in the context 
of the argument presented in this article, a text I would not hesitate to de-
scribe as a programmatic, self-reflective manifesto commenting on the clash 
of contemporary artistic tendencies and revealing Gombrowicz’s attempts to 
create his own writerly strategy.
It is by no accident that the space of the “closely sealed” household re-
sembles a “theatrical stage.” The plot is founded on the process of dialogue 
between opposites. If Gombrowicz’s “artificial protagonists” are to be treated 
as different sides of an aesthetic argument, we shall discover that the isolated 
house is not a metaphor for the theatre, but the (macroscopic) social sphere 
or the writer’s (microscopic) individual struggle with artistic convention. It 
is hard to resist the impression that the characters playing parts in the aes-
thetic debate directly present their programs. The widow represents the order 
of realist–empathetic art:
 49 Ibid., 163.
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“In the night,” she said dazedly, “Last night… I got up this morning… 
I went in… I called – Ignaś, Ignaś – but there was no response; he was 
lying there… I fainted… I fainted… And from that moment my hands 
have not stopped trembling – see for yourself!”50
She stood fanatically, silent, with staring eyes, like Niobe, her gaze fixed 
on her memories, crumpled, disheveled; and a tiny droplet appeared at 
the tip of her nose and dangled there, and dangled… like the sword of 
Damocles – and the candles smoked. (Gombrowicz, 44)
In this short passage, Gombrowicz presents an entire array of trespasses 
of Romantic and neo-Romantic literature: its sentimentality and nostalgia 
(“her gaze fixed on her memories”), the imperative to empathize (“see for 
yourself”), literalness and exhibitionism (I got up this morning… I went 
in… I called… I fainted”), circumlocution and exaltation (“Ignaś, Ignaś… 
I fainted… I fainted.”), irritating mood building techniques (“and the candles 
smoked”), lack of formal discipline (“crumpled, disheveled”), finally – over-
individualization and primitivism (“and a tiny droplet appeared at the tip 
of her nose and dangled there, and dangled”). In turn, the spirit of modern 
art is revealed in the figuration of the son, reacting sharply to his mother’s 
affectation:
“What’s the point, Mama?”… No one is… No one will be… it makes 
no difference. It’s embarrassing!” he burst out violently and suddenly 
turned his back and walked away. “Antoś!” his mother called in fright […]. 
“A blow, an awful blow… The children said nothing. They’re proud, dif-
ficult, reserved, they won’t just allow anyone into their hearts, but rather 
prefer to worry on their own… Antoś is tough, stubborn, he won’t even 
let his hands twitch.” (43)
The protagonist who “restrains” his feelings, embarrassed by the mother’s 
emotionality, represents the new, avant-garde generation of artists who 
view art as “a function, a service, a craft.”51 He fervently fights to eradi-
cate all manifestations of the old order and subjects himself to the dis-
cipline of the form, carefully selecting his words and distancing himself 
from the pain: “Apparently this morning you visited my father or rather, 
 50 Witold Gombrowicz, ”A Premeditated Crime,” in Bacacay, trans. Bill Johnston (New York: 
Archipelago Books, 2006), 41.
 51 Jalu Kurek quoted in Hutnikiewicz, Od czystej formy, 227.
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pardon me, his body” (57). He would rather remain silent than to admit 
strong affect.
“Did you love your father very much?” I asked… The auestion clearly took 
him by surprise. No, he was not prepared for it; he bowed his head, looked 
to the side, swallowed and muttered with inexpressible constraint, almost 
with repugnance: “I suppose.” (57)
Interestingly, in his portrayal of modern artistic tendencies, Gombrowicz re-
veals also their (and also his own) formal techniques: 
That was…. it was irony… You understand?… The opposite… on pur-
pose” – “Being ironic about your father’s death?”… “Surely there’s nothing 
embarrassing about one’s father’s death” … Or perhaps you’re embar-
rassed because you loved him? He stammered with difficulty with abhor-
rence with despair: “Very well. If you absolutely … then yes, so be it… 
I loved him.” And throwing something on the table, he cried: “Here! This 
is his hair!” (69)
The mention of irony, expressions such as “opposite,” “on purpose,” and the 
symbolic strand of hair are synonymous to the avant-gardists’ rich repertoire 
of means to create distance: from embarrassment, the grotesque, to masking, 
deformation, and ellipsis. What is interesting in the story is also the status 
of the intruder, the investigator who could be seen as the protagonist’s porte-
parole. On the one hand, he clearly distances himself from all emphatic dis-
plays (such as the “odor of family affection”) and the principles of the old art, 
tradition, and canon:
They make people pay homage to them – kiss their hands! They demand 
sentiments from me! Sentiments! They demand to be humored! And I, 
let’s say, I hate that. And let’s say, I hate it when they have me tremble to 
make me kiss their hands, when they compel me to mumble prayers, to 
kneel, to produce false, sentimental noises – and above all I hate tears, 
sighs, and droplets at the tips of their noses; whereas I like cleanliness 
and order. (45-46)
Thus, the investigator-artist surely appears closer to the modern concept 
of art represented by the son: “I had a wish to confess to… big brother my 
mistake and the trouble I had caused. It seemed to me that he would un-
derstand… and surely he wouldn’t refuse me” (74). But on the other hand, 
Gombrowicz’s protagonist remains undoubtedly separate, distant, vigilant, 
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and suspicious; he constantly oscillates between two models: the realist 
one, where death is seen as a natural and biological act, and the intellectual 
one, where it is the consequence of a crime constituting a certain “interfer-
ence” or “construct.” As a result, in the process of the investigation, several 
spectacular discoveries are made, for instance that of “the terrible duality” 
of each and every feeling (72) – a duality which is probably a testimony 
to the complex “rational–emotional” nature of all affect. The investigator 
also becomes convinced of the risk involved or perhaps the utopian char-
acter of the declared, avant-garde restraint: “Here again I lowered my voice 
and whispered in his ear: «You loved him… but why was there so much 
shame, so much scorn in that love?… Why do you conceal it like a criminal 
concealing a crime? You don’t answer? You don’t know? Perhaps I will know 
for you»” (70). With these words Gombrowicz makes an aesthetic declara-
tion: aware of the limitations and traps of the two clashing tendencies, he 
proposes a new path of investigation, approaching the model which could 
be for now referred to as the “third mode.” It would focus on problematizing 
the tensions between the rational and the affective, the intellectual and the 
realist, which is precisely what constitutes the “content” of the story. Here, 
the corpse of the father becomes a metaphor of the work of art, whose 
status depends on creative (and interpretative) profiling. As we know, 
Gombrowicz ultimately chooses the “third option” – the deceased do not 
“die” of natural causes, nor is he a victim of mental “cardiac death.” But the 
work can no longer be taken to be a faithful representation of experiences 
and emotions, and by Gombrowicz’s choice, it is also not meant to become 
the language of discipline and form, which are nothing more than a trick, 
“a vicious circle” clearly returning art to the recently cursed reality.52 Hence 
the solution: the body and the work fall victim to a conscious “premeditated 
crime” problematizing the status of the criminal/investigator/artist and the 
artifact itself – a crime “squared,” performed in plain sight and requiring 
premeditation. Gombrowicz’s verdict is clear: the avant-garde work which 
fails to conceptualize its status and function means nothing, it is an escape 
“a sign of the timidity of feelings which retreat and contract at the cold touch 
of a stranger” (60); consequently it fails to reveal the artistic gesture, leaves 
“not the slightest marks of asphyxiation on [the] body” (60). The work of the 
investigator, the artist of the “third mode,” requires clear authorial signature, 
a trace of the artist’s touch, a “clear imprint of all ten fingers” on the “dead 
man’s neck” (75).
 52 Stanisław Machniewicz, Wybór pism estetycznych, ed. Sław Krzemień-Ojak (Kraków: Uni-
versitas, 2012), 84.
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A Machine for the Production of Meanings
In the attempt to describe precisely the specificity of art’s “third mode,” one 
should consider also non-literary examples (which largely confirm the va-
lidity of the proposed investigations), for instance, the works created by the 
group connected to the French journal Documents: the conceptualizations 
of Georges Bataille, Eli Lotar, Man Ray, Max Ernst, and Hans Bellmer which 
disturb, hypnotize, and seduce perhaps with their ambiguity precisely as a re-
sult of the tension between the affective and the conceptual.
Several sculptures by Alberto Giacometti can also be considered as model 
examples of the artistic mode discussed in this essay, among them Suspended 
Ball, an intriguing installation from 1930 (which started among the Surrealists 
the trend of producing sexually charged works). Giacometti’s erotic machine, 
consisting of a movable, suspended ball made of stone and plowed from be-
low by a long, moon-shaped wedge, placed within a metal, cage-like frame 
provoked mixed reactions, and not without a reason. Critics compared them 
to “strong but undefined sexual emotions related to unconscious desires,”53 
adding that “the emotions did not arouse satisfaction of any kind” but rather 
“an irritating anxiety.”54 Rosalind Krauss locates the work’s source of power 
in the connection it makes between the supposedly opposite orders – love 
and violence, as well as between the sexes – while employing simple modest 
means. But the force of impact of Suspended Ball could have several other, quite 
diverse explanations.55
Giacometti’s “machine for the production of meanings” may be read 
as a consequence of the artist’s ethnographic fascination with primitivism, 
for instance, figures alluding to an ancient Mexican game where a stone 
wedge functioned as a ball. Hitting with it selected body parts (especially 
knees and buttocks) was meant to symbolize a combination of cruelty 
and vitality. In another related interpretation, Suspended Ball in form may 
have been inspired by Bataille’s History of the Eye, and particularly by the 
ambiguous status of the eyeball (also connected to other spherical objects 
such as the sun, the egg, etc.). 
 53 Maurice Nadeau, Histoire du surréalisme (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1945), 176 (quoted 
in Krauss, Oryginalność awangardy, 63-64).
 54 Krauss, Oryginalność awangardy, 63-64.
 55 Giacometti’s sculpture reveals itself, in fact, as a classical open work as defined by Um-
berto Eco, one which encourages the audience’s active participation because “the form 
itself is so constructed as to appear ambiguous and to assume different shapes depend-
ing on the angle from which it is viewed” (and this certainly means more than just the 
physical angle of observation), Eco, The Open Work, 85.
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Considering the elements the sculpture consists of, its composition sug-
gests that the elements’ potential mobility, the audience’s perception and ver-
dict tend to frame them firstly as a figuration of the constant, perhaps in-
evitable interaction of bodies and sexes: the furrowed ball may symbolize 
femininity and the wedge could stand for the “plowing” male activity. In this 
way, the sculpture materializes the sexual potentiality of action and physical 
integration. The swaying movement and the “grinding” of the two elements 
also point to another interpretative possibility, suggesting, for instance, a play 
of meanings between that which is static (the wedge), but not passive as it 
carves the other element, and the ball which is mobile, but lacking actual 
agency, as it is subjected to the process of “carving.” Critics also saw in it an 
act of primordial violence resembling the famous slicing of the eyeball with 
a razor in Buñuel’s An Andalusian Dog. Finally, Giacometti’s installation can 
be read also as an expression of castration anxiety, of the fear of dominance 
and appropriation in general.
However, Giacometti’s sculpture becomes as ambiguous as the eroticism 
of Bataille’s eye is transgressive. If the eye is to symbolize the gaze-centric or-
der, usually identified in the modern tradition with the rational, male element, 
then the ball itself could be read as a hollistic, “round phallicness” opposed to 
the moon-shaped wedge.56 The sculpture, moreover, can be viewed from yet 
a different angle (one that for several reasons is more attractive): we could 
read the signifying ambiguity of Suspended Ball and the “dissolution of differ-
ence” between femininity and masculinity – passivity and activity – as an 
intended gesture suggesting the need of going beyond the binary divisions 
and negating both sexual and erotic dualism.
Additionally, the blurring of boundaries and the dissolution of divisions 
could be an attempt at leaving behind the traditional distinction of the intel-
lectual/spiritual and the physical spheres, as well as the rational and instinc-
tual ones. The metal frame where the ball and the wedge are placed would 
then become a kind of cage, a designed, separated space, an artistic laboratory 
revealing actual relations of supposedly radically different potentialities. The 
“design” does not necessarily imply the “artificiality” of the presented mecha-
nism, but rather reveals the need to find an appropriate scale allowing to show 
clearly the nature of the affective-somatic and intellectual processes. Similar 
interpretative intuitions can be found in the somewhat enigmatic remarks 
by Michel Leiris, awed by the innovativeness, intensity, and the ability to “ex-
press emotional ambivalence” found in Giacometti’s sculpture:
 56 For more on the tradition of relating the lunar metaphors to femininity see, for instance, 
Kazimiera Szczuka, “Prządki, tkaczki, pająki,” Biuletyn OŚKi 3(8), (1990): 46-51.
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Among the works of art one finds few objects (paintings or sculptures) 
capable of at least meeting the basic requirements of that true fetish-
ism, in other words, love… revealing itself under a hard shell, enclosing it 
within the range of a tangible thing, placed like a piece of furniture, in this 
vast, strange house known as space… There are moments which could be 
referred to as moments of crisis and only those matter in life. Moments 
when suddenly that which is external begins to meet the demands sig-
naled by our interior, moments when the outside world opens itself to 
allow a connection with our hearts… I like Giacometti’s sculpture because 
everything he does seems to preserve a crisis of this kind in stone, and it 
is marked with the intensity of a sudden incident, immediately captured 
and frozen… and yet nothing in the sculpture is dead, on the contrary, 
everything can be worshipped like in true fetishes…57 
The sculpture becomes a “piece of furniture,” that is, a material artifact 
serving as a handy (and otherwise inexpressible) figuration of a certain af-
fect. However, Giacometti’s work is also a “protective armor,” which could 
be understood not only as a “shield” for something, but also an anatomical 
metaphor. It is a hard cover for defensive and representative purposes, but first 
and foremost (as in the case of insects) an “exoskeleton” – an indispensible 
and basic construction element. As such, the “shell” is located neither on the 
outside, nor on the inside, thus annulling the binary distinction between 
the external and the internal. The sculpture, similarly, is not a “container for 
meanings,” a representation of some previously experienced state transcribed 
into a work of art. Giacometti’s work i s  i t s e l f  this affective state, becoming 
its own fetish or embodiment, which Leiris believes should be “worshipped,” 
or perceived as the act of perception activates the affective–signifying po-
tential. The “emotional ambivalence” experienced in a confrontation with the 
sculpture is precisely a recreation (though one following a new set of rules) 
of a specific fusion, a mediation between the artist and the external world 
which happens in “moments of crisis.” 
This equally physical, instinctual, and mental opportunity for actions 
and experience thus becomes the actual object of interest here because, firstly, 
the movement it suggests takes place on several levels of the artist’s integra-
tion with the environment, when “that which is external begins to meet the 
demands signaled by our interior” and, secondly, the opportunities to act, 
and their very potentiality, could be posited as the founding principle of the 
concept of Suspended Ball where the movement smoothly turns into rest, ac-
tivity into passivity, aggression into submission, masculinity into feminity, 
 57 Michel Leiris, „Alberto Giacometti,” trans. M. Kędzierski, Konteksty 3-4 (2007): 163.
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and so forth; and where it is difficult to distinguish between the supposedly 
opposite orders. Finally, a confrontation with Giacometti’s work could be re-
vealed as essential, one where the sculpture “emanates” with meanings, acti-
vating its affective agency and the model viewer (in this case Leiris) is “drawn 
into a vast dark vortex, those uncanny trance-inducing moments”58 and later, 
on the basis of his aesthetic experience, perceives the sculpture as a reservoir 
of meanings, including his own emotions and affects: “those beautiful objects 
which I can see and touch are the nucleus of my many memories.”59
Analyzing the mechanisms of Suspended Ball from this angle and consid-
ering the wealth of its readings and the force of its impact, one may risk yet 
another interpretative trope: namely that the sculpture implies and prob-
lematizes the work of drives, desires, and affects, blocked and rationalized, 
and yet evading the domination of the mind. In this reading, Giacometti’s cage 
would be no longer an agonal space where the masculine and the feminine 
clash, but a metaphor of the human psychosomatic order where the mind, the 
unconscious, and the body continuously converse.
On the Originality of the Avant-garde Feeling
The aim of artistic works eluding the known aesthetic categories of modern-
ism would be to embody or figure or materialize the artistic impasse result-
ing from the difficulty of choice between two paradigms of presentation. At 
the same time, those realizations would move beyond the dualist reasoning 
and the split between the spiritual and material dimensions. In such cases, 
the avant-garde artists would draw inspiration precisely from the tensions 
between the various orders. A direct stimulus to initiate the creative processes 
would come from the sphere located at the point of contact between the tradi-
tionally understood spheres of reason and physicality, spirituality and materi-
ality. What I have in mind here is precisely the sphere of affect which I believe 
to be of key importance in order to understand the more general regularity 
which is the source of avant-garde’s actual originality.
Consequently, the proposed “alternative” artistic model would be inspired 
by the techniques of intellectual art, but at the same time it would express 
and problematize issues resisting rationalization, presented and described 
so far through the categories of suppression, repression, division, and break-
down. Speaking generally, the engine of such artistic investigations would be 
fueled not so much by the fissure between soul and matter, mind and body, 
 58 Ibid., 163.
 59 Ibid., 163.
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or sacrum and profanum, but rather by the intuition of a kinship and osmosis 
between these orders. We are no longer talking about the ideal of mirroring 
reality or expressing authentic emotions (as in the more traditional para-
digms of understanding art), but about repeated attempts to conceptualize the 
complexity and ambiguity of the experiential–affective sphere – both in the 
existential dimension, experienced by the individual trying to determine their 
attitude to their chaotic, unpredictable, and encompassing reality, and in the 
aesthetic one, that is, the affect of the artist toward the created work which 
may precisely be a fear of being fortunate enough to find artistic solutions. 
This is why the specificity of this modernist mode would rely on an anxious 
ambivalence – an uneasiness created by the object of presentation, which 
somehow “demands” a description, and by the responsibility of making formal 
choices. Consequently, in the third mode of experience, emotion and affect 
become the proper object of the avant-garde play with audience sensibility, 
conventions, canons, and perception models, but also (as stimuli for creative 
processes) with the invention of the artists themselves. The affective amal-
gam would thus function as a special “invisible object,”60 responsible for the 
initiation of the artistic gesture, but also subjected to a necessary processing 
that ultimately complicates an unequivocal decoding.
Translation: Anna Warso
 60 I am alluding here to Giacometti’s intriguing 1934 sculpture, Invisible Object. 
